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Abstract
Even though Richard Routley is known as a proponent of so-called
nuclear Meinongianism (in his terminology, noneism), the details of his
view in Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1980) have not at-
tracted much attention. In this paper, I critically examine two notable
but less known features of Meinongianism in Routley (1980) which par-
ticularly concern a core claim of nuclear Meinongianism that so-called
Characterization Principle (CP) is applicable to nuclear properties
(in his terminology, characterizing properties) but not to extranuclear
properties (in his terminology, noncharacterizing properties): The first
one is his ‘double determination’ argument for restricting the class of
properties to which CP is applicable; and the second is his expansion
of the class of nuclear properties in terms of the supposition operator s.
Firstly, I will show that the double determination argument fails, since,
for some extranuclear properties, the argument fails to justify that CP
is not applicable to them, and, moreover, the argument unintendedly
shows that CP is not applicable to some nuclear properties. Secondly,
based on the idea that the supposition operator, combined with any
property f , forms the intensional property of being assumed to have
f , I will give a formal treatment of the supposition operator within
the framework of world semantics. We will see that this interpretation
goes beyond Routley’s original nuclear Meinongianism and assimilates
his view with modal Meinongianism proposed by Priest (2005, 2016).
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1 Introduction: nuclear Meinongianism
Meinongianism is the view that ‘some objects do not exist, but we can gen-
erally refer to them, quantify over them, and make true claims about them’
(Berto and Plebani, 2015, p. 100). There are several versions of Meinongian-
ism, and the simplest and notoriously problematic one is naive Meinongian-
ism. Naive Meiongianism is a version of Meinongianism which endorses the
following naive Characterization Principle (henceforth, I use CP for Charac-
terization Principle):
(1) naive CP: For any characterization (that is, any set of first-order prop-
erties), some (existent or nonexistent) object satisfies it (that is, it has
all properties in the set).
Russell (1905) provided one of the most famous counterexamples to naive
Meinongianism: The existent golden mountain. As Russell argued, from
naive CP, it follows that the existent golden mountain exists. Take the set
of the following three properties: being existent, being golden and being a
mountain. From naive CP, it follows that something has all of these proper-
ties, that is, the existent golden mountain exists. However, since, of course,
there exists no golden mountain, it doesn’t exist. A contradiction follows.
Meinongians, including Meinong himself, have proposed several solutions
to this problem. One of such solutions is defended by nuclear Meinongianism
(Jacquette, 2015; Parsons, 1980; Routley, 1980). Nuclear Meinongianism is
based on the following two key ideas: (i) There are two different kinds of prop-
erties, that is, nuclear and extranuclear properties; and (ii) CP is applicable
only to characterizations consisting of nuclear properties. Note that different
authors use different terminologies for the two kinds of properties: Nuclear
and extranuclear (Findlay, 1963; Parsons, 1980); constitutive and extracon-
stitutive (Jacquette, 2015); and characterizing and noncharacterizing prop-
erties/predicates (Routley, 1980). Even though this difference is not merely
terminological, as long as our investigation in this paper concerns, we can
regard these distinctions as basically the same one.1 To avoid the complexity,
in what follows, we use the most popular one, that is, ‘nuclear/extranuclear’
terminology (even though different terminologies will appear in quotation).
In sum, nuclear Meinongianism is the version of Meinongianism which en-
dorses the following nuclear CP, instead of naive CP.
1For the difference between Parsons and Routley, see Routley (1980, p. 265, n 1).
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(2) nuclear CP: For any characterization which contains only nuclear prop-
erties (that is, any set of nuclear properties), some (existent or nonex-
istent) object satisfies it (that is, some object has all properties in the
set).2
A nuclear Meinongian solution to the problem of the existent golden
mountain goes as follows.3 According to nuclear Meinongianism, existence is
not a nuclear property, but an extranuclear property. So, we can not apply
CP to the set of the properties of being a mountain, being golden, and being
existent. Therefore, it does not follow from nuclear CP that the existent
golden mountain exists.
As we have already seen, a crucial assumption of nuclear Meinongian-
ism is that there are two different kinds of properties, that is, nuclear and
extranuclear properties. Then, first of all, which properties are nuclear and
which ones are extranuclear? The following is a list of core examples of these
two kinds of properties.4 On the one hand, nuclear properties are ordinary
first-order properties like being blue, being tall, kicking Socrates, being kicked
by Socrates, being golden, being a mountain, and so on. On the other hand,
core examples of extranuclear properties include: Ontological properties like
existence; modal properties like being (im)possible; intensional (and inten-
tional) properties like being thought about by Russell ; and technical proper-
ties like being (in)complete, being (in)consistent and so on. Secondly, how
are these two kinds of properties distinguished? A standard exposition of the
2Routley formulates this as FCP, “2A(ξxA(x)), where A(x) is a wff (containing just
x free) constructed in an allowable way from characterising predicate” (Routley, 1980, p.
342). Routley specified two allowable ways to construct complex predicates from nuclear
predicates: Predicate negation and conjunction. Note also that Routley clearly distin-
guishes predicate negation and sentential negation and claims that the former generates a
complex nuclear properties, but the latter doesn’t.
3By incorporating the so-called watering-down principle, Parsons (1980) provides an-
other, more complicated, solution to the problem. Routley also proposes a different com-
plication concerning what properties the existent golden mountain has. See Section 3 and
4 of this paper.
4See Parsons (1980, p. 23); Routley (1980, p. 264-268). According to Routley, pred-
icates to which CP is not applicable are sentential negation, higher-order (predicate or
sentential) quantification, “or predicate defined in terms of such quantification, notably
ontic and modal predicates such as E and 3, logical predicates such as ≈ and =, and
theoretical predicate such as ‘determinate’ and ‘complete’ ” (Routley, 1980, pp. 260-261).
He also holds that intensional properties are not characterizing properties. See Routley
(1980, p. 266).
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distinction is this: Nuclear properties are properties which constitute the na-
ture of an object. On the other hand, extranuclear properties are properties
which do not constitute the nature of an object and are “external” to it (cf.
Routley, 1980, p. 856). Routley claims that the distinction corresponds to
“the traditional distinction between essence-specifying [properties] and those
that cannot be used in specifying the essence or nature of a thing” (Routley,
1980, p. 348). Moreover, some theorists claim that extranuclear properties
are properties whose possession by an object is determined by its nuclear
properties. According to Routley, extranuclear properties are “consequential,
i.e. depend for their determination on the prior determination of lower order
ones [=nuclear properties]” (Routley, 1980, p. 261).5
So far this has been a brief exposition of nuclear Meinongianism. Rout-
ley’s Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1980) is known as a detailed
exposition and defense of nuclear Meinongianism.6 However, it is fair to say
that not much attention has been paid to Routley’s theory per se. Indeed,
in the literature, Parsons (1980) is regarded as a representative of nuclear
Meinongianism and it is often the case that Routley (1980) is just mentioned
as one of the other attempts of developing nuclear Meinongianism and noth-
ing more is stated on his view.7
However, Routley (1980) deserves more attention, since it has several re-
markable features. First of all, Routley (1980) broadens the topics related
with Meinongianism. For example, Routley’s theory provides an extensive
discussion about the importance of Meinongianism in mathematics and the
theoretical sciences; it develops an interesting combination of Meinongianism
and presentism; and it also contains historical considerations on Meinong’s
theory and other related theories like one by Thomas Reid. Secondly, Rout-
ley (1980) also tries to improve the nuclear Meinongian theory of nonexistent
objects per se in some distinctive ways. Focusing on the latter, in this pa-
5Jacquette makes the same point:
The totalities of every intended object’s Sosein of constitutive properties in
turn provide the supervenience or ontic dependence base for the intended
object’s extraconstitutive ontic properties of existing or not existing, being
possible or impossible, relevantly predicationally complete or incomplete, and
the like. (Jacquette, 2015, p. xxx)
6Routley did not call his own view so. He named his theory of nonexistent objects
noneism.
7For some exceptions, see, in particular, Rapaport (1984) and Paoletti (2013).
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per, I examine two such attempts which particularly concern a core claim
of nuclear Meinongianism, that is, the restriction of CP’s applicability. The
first one is his “double determination” argument for restricting CP, accord-
ing to which we can not apply CP to extranuclear properties, since whether
an object has an extranuclear property or not is determined solely in terms
of its nuclear properties; the second one is his extension of nuclear CP in
terms of the supposition operator, s, which, combined with any extranu-
clear property f , creates a nuclear property of presenting itself as having f .
These two attempts are worthy of special mention, since they are related to
two well-known difficulties concerning nuclear Meinongianism. Firstly, it is
often claimed that the nuclear Meinongian distinction between nuclear and
extranuclear properties are ad hoc and unmotivated. The double determi-
nation argument is a notable attempt to justify the distinction. Secondly,
restricting CP only to nuclear properties allegedly results in the failure of
making the distinction between an existent golden mountain and a golden
mountain. By enlarging the class of nuclear properties in terms of the sup-
position operator, Routley tries to give a way to distinguish them.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I introduce Routley’s
double determination argument and critically examine it. We will see that the
double determination argument fails for the following two reasons: Firstly,
some extranuclear properties are such that whether an object has them is not
determined solely by which nuclear properties it has; secondly, if the argu-
ment showed that CP is not applicable to extranuclear properties, it would
also show that CP is not applicable to a certain range of nuclear properties.
In section 3, I introduce the supposition operator s and see how it expands
the range of properties to which CP is applicable. I also examine how we
can define the semantics of the indefinite description ξxA(x) by using the
supposition operator. Finally, in Section 4, by interpreting the supposition
operator as an intensional-predicate-forming operator, where s(f) is inter-
preted as the property of being assumed to have f , I give a formal semantics
of the supposition operator based on world semantics. We will see that this
interpretation goes beyond Routley’s original nuclear Meinongianism and
assimilates his view with modal Meinongianism proposed by Priest (2005,
2016).
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2 Routley’s double determination argument for
restricting CP
There are several objections against nuclear Meinongianism. A typical criti-
cism to it is that the restriction of CP adopted by nuclear Meinongianism is
ad hoc and unmotivated.8 Priest says:
The problem for this line [that is, restricting the applicability of
CP to a certain kind of properties] is to give a principled charac-
terization of what constitutes a characterizing predicate and why.
No one, as far as I am aware, has been able to do this. Certain
classes of predicates can be circumscribed and deemed safe. But
without an appropriate rationale, it is difficult to avoid the feel-
ing that the class has been gerrymandered simply to avoid prob-
lems. . . . As observed, it would appear to be the case that we can
think about an object satisfying any set of conditions whatsoever.
Phenomenologically, at least, there is absolutely no difference be-
tween contemplating an objet that has only officially character-
izing properties . . . and one that has some non-characterizing
properties as well, say existence. Qua object of thought, each ob-
ject seems to have all the properties deployed. Drawing distinc-
tions within these properties seems entirely unmotivated. (Priest,
2016, pp. 83-84)
According to this objection, in order to show non-ad hocness of the restriction
to CP, it is not sufficient for nuclear Meinongianism to provide some princi-
pled way to distinguish two different kinds of properties in question. Rather,
nuclear Meinongians must explain why only one of these kinds of properties
can be used to characterize objects. As Priest says, the conceivability (or
assumability) of any object is radically free.9 In particular, we can think
about an object as having not only nuclear properties but also extranuclear
8Another main objection to nuclear Meinongianism concerns its commitment to lit-
eralism, the view that nonexistent objects actually and literally have the properties by
which they are characterized. Literalism claims, for instance, that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a
detective’ is literally true in the actual world. However, the objection goes, this is coun-
terintuitive, since what is (intuitively) true is ‘in Doyle’s Holmes story, Sherlock Holmes
is a detective’, not ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’. See Fine (1984) and Parsons (1980).
9For the conceivability of the impossible, see Priest (2016) and Berto (2013).
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properties. Priest argues that this fact shows that CP is applicable to both
kinds of properties.
Routley disagrees with Priest. First of all, he emphasizes the distinction
between the Freedom of Assumption Principle, according to which “one can
assume anything, contemplate any object at all” (Routley, 1980, p. 256)
and an unrestricted CP, and claims that the latter does not follow from the
former. He claims:
The Freedom of Assumption Principle is unrestricted; so, it has
been invalidly inferred, must the CP be likewise unrestricted. The
argument is invalid because an item [= an object] may not have
all the features in terms of which it is contemplated. (Routley,
1980, p. 256)
Indeed, according to him,
any object can be assumed: by no means all of them are reliable in
the way they present themselves (as τxA) [τ is some description-
forming operator] as to how they are (whether they are indeed
A) (Routley, 1980, p. 258)
and it is important to distinguish “what can be assumed and what reliably
has the features it present itself (when assumed) as having” (Routley, 1980,
p. 258). For example, consider the existent golden mountain. According to
Routley, the existent golden mountain presents itself as existent, but it is not
reliable with respect to this presentation. Indeed, it is not existent.
For the sake of the discussion in Section 4, it is important here to specify
that the passages quoted from Routley suggests a strong connection between
assumption and presentation: It suggests that x presents itself as having a
property f iff x is assumed to have f . Moreover, reliability seems not to be
a property of object per se, but a property that an object has only relative
to some description. For example, it makes sense to say that an existent
golden mountain presents itself as existent, but does not make sense to say
that a golden mountain presents itself as existent. However, since an existent
golden mountain is a golden mountain, it is possible that they are identical.
Now recall Priest’s argument for an unrestricted CP quoted above. The
latter half of it appeals to the idea that we can indifferently use any property
to characterize an object. Given Routley’s distinction between the Freedom
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of Assumption Principle and an unrestricted CP, we can regard Priest as
simply pointing out the fact that we can freely assume an object to have
any properties. If Routley is correct, it doesn’t follow from this that the
unrestricted CP is true.
But, why should the application of CP be restricted to only characteriza-
tions consisting of nuclear properties/predicates, even though we can freely
assume any object? According to Routley, there is a good reason for such a
restriction and it is not an ad hoc assumption made merely to avoid contradic-
tions that follow from naive CP. Indeed, Routley suggests that a restriction
of CP and the consistency of the theory of (existent and nonexistent) ob-
jects are independent. In particular, he suggests that, even for theorists who
adopt nuclear CP, it is an open matter of commonsense whether the theory
of objects is consistent or paraconsistent (Routley, 1980, p. 534).
Routley provides the following argument for restricting CP. The restric-
tion of CP in question is justified by the fact that it is required to exclude
‘double determination’ of properties. He claims:
assumptions do not, and should not settle the ontological or modal
status of assumed items [= objects]: existence and possibility of
items are consequential properties of items, properties which are
consequential on defining features of items, but not themselves
characterising features of items (Routley, 1980, p. 256)
and
The limits imposed then are intended to exclude double determi-
nation, in particular determination by description or characterisa-
tion of what is already or independently (and perhaps differently)
determined (e.g. by how the world is, by other characterisation).
(Routley, 1980, p. 261. My emphasis)
To make his point clear, let us call a property p n-determined if whether an
object has p is determined by what nuclear properties it has: More precisely,
for any object o and the set of its nuclear properties N , whether o has p or
not is uniquely fixed by N . Some extranuclear properties are n-determined.
Completeness/incompleteness and consistency/inconsistency would be good
examples of such extranuclear properties: Whether an object is complete or
not is determined by which nuclear properties the object has; and whether
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an object is consistent or not is determined by which nuclear properties the
object has. For these properties, such dependence is quite explicit in their
definitions. For example, completeness and incompleteness could be defined
as follows (cf. Parsons, 1980, p. 106)
(3) a. x is complete := for any nuclear property p, x has p or x has non-p
b. x is incomplete := ∼ x is complete
(4) a. x is consistent := for any nuclear property p, ∼ (x has p and x has
non-p).
b. x is inconsistent := ∼ x is consistent
where non-p is understood as the predicate negation of p and ∼ is the classical
sentential negation. Following Routley, let us assume that for any nuclear
property p, non-p, its predicate negation, is also nuclear. Then, given (3a),
whether an object is complete or not is uniquely determined solely by its
nuclear properties. If it has p or non-p for any nuclear p, it is complete;
and if not, it is not. In this way, some extranuclear properties are such that
whether an object has them is determined by which nuclear properties the
object has.
Now Routley’s argument is explicated as follows. Consider a set of some
nuclear propertiesN . Suppose thatN is the set of all of the nuclear properties
of an object o, that is, o has all nuclear properties in N and no other nuclear
properties. Since the completeness of objects are n-determined, whether o
is complete or incomplete is determined solely by N . There is no room for
the additional characterization of completeness of o to determine its com-
pleteness. Therefore, the property of being complete is a property which we
should not use to characterize an object. Let us call this argument the double
determination argument.
Routley’s double determination argument is, however, problematic. First
of all, not all extranuclear properties are n-determined, or, at least, their
n-determinedness is contentious. Consider existence. Given Meinong’s Prin-
ciple of Independence, according to which Sein of an object (existence, sub-
sistence, and non-being) is independent from its Sosein (here I understand
this as its nuclear properties, or, its possession of certain nuclear properties),
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it is hardly the case that there is some set of nuclear properties whose pos-
session by an object a priori determines its existence.10 Even the ontological
argument for God’s existence does not provide us an example of such a set,
since, in the argument, the existence of God is inferred from its perfection,
which is certainly extranuclear.
A possible reply to this objection is this: Routley proposes the following
definition of existence, according to which existence is a property defined by
using higher-order quantification over properties. Given this definition, even
existence can be taken as n-determined.
(5) x exists := for every extensional property p, it is necessary that, if x
has non-p, then it is not true that x has p, and it is contingently true
that, if it is not true that x has p, then x has non-p. (cf. Routley, 1980,
p. 244; See also Paoletti, 2013, p. 283)
It is not our concern whether this definition is correct or not. For the sake of
argument, let us assume that (5) is correct. Then, given this definition, it is
true that a certain set of nuclear properties entails that an object which has
all nuclear properties in the set does not exist: For example, if an object is
red and non-red, then it doesn’t exist. However, this definition is not enough
to determine whether a consistent object exists or not solely in terms of its
nuclear properties. In particular, merely by its nuclear properties, it is not
determined whether the first conjunct in the definition (5) (= ‘it is necessary
that, if x has non-p, then it is not true that x has p’) is satisfied. Therefore,
even if (5) is correct, it doesn’t follow that existence is n-determined.
Another example is provided by intensional properties like being thought
about by Russell. The round square has the property of being thought about by
Russell. However, whether the intentional relation between Russell and the
round square in question holds is not determined by the nuclear properties of
the round square: Indeed, the round square had these nuclear properties even
before Russell was born, when the intentional relation did not hold between
the round square and Russell.
In this way, not all nuclear properties are n-determined, and, therefore,
the double determination argument does not justify the elimination of all
extranuclear properties from the class of properties to which CP is applicable.
10Even though the Principle of Independence is one of the core principles of Meinon-
gianism and Nuclear Meinongianism adopts it, some Meinongians reject it. In particular,
Priest’s modal Meinongianism claims that many ordinary first order properties like being a
mountain are existence-entailing: An object’s having such properties entails its existence.
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Secondly, if the double determination argument provides a good reason
for restricting CP, it results in the inapplicability of a certain range of char-
acterizations consisting only of nuclear properties. To see why, let us fo-
cus on the fact that some nuclear properties are not mutually independent.
The point is illustrate by a predicament which early Wittgenstein faced:
A predicament concerning mutual independence of atomic propositions. In
Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims that atomic propositions are mutually inde-
pendent. A truth of an atomic proposition neither entails nor excludes any
other atomic proposition. However, it is well-known that this claim is prob-
lematic (Anscombe, 1959). For example, the truth of the proposition that
an object o is blue eliminates the truth of the proposition that o is red and
vice versa. This mutual exclusion of these atomic propositions is naturally
explained by the fact that an object’s being blue excludes its being red. Now,
by appealing to this mutual exclusion of color properties, one can define the
negative color properties like being non-red as follows:
(6) x is non-red := for some p, p is a color property, p 6= red, and x is p
This definition means that an object is non-red iff it has some color property
other than red. For example, if an object is blue, it is non-red. This is
intuitively correct. Then, given this definition and that color properties are
nuclear, non-red is extranuclear. Indeed, whether an object is non-red or
not is determined solely by its nuclear properties: If some color property
other than red is contained in its nuclear properties, it is non-red; if not,
it isn’t. Now, if this is correct, from the double determination argument,
it follows that non-red should not be used to characterize an object. But,
this significantly weakens the expressivity and explanatory power of nuclear
Meinongianism. In particular, it renders nuclear Meinongianism incapable
of treating inconsistent objects like a non-square square, at least in the way
defined in (4).
In this way, Routley’s double determination argument for restricting CP
fails. Indeed, there is a strong argument that at least some extranuclear
properties are relevant to the identity and difference between objects, and
thus, should be taken as a part of objects’ nature. Consider an existent
golden mountain and a golden mountain. Intuitively, we can regard them to
be different objects. The latter can be a nonexistent object which doesn’t
embody any contradiction: It may be simply nonexistent. On the other hand,
the former, at least apparently, does: It is both existent and not. How can
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we distinguish them without counting existence as a part of characterization
of the former?
Partly in order to accommodate this problem, Routley (1980) proposes
a way of extending the range of properties to which CP is applicable, which
results in a version of unrestricted CP, in an appropriate sense. Let’s see it
in the next section.
3 The supposition operator, unrestricted CP
and semantics of ξ-terms
Routley proposes several ways to enlarge the class of properties to which
CP is applicable. Among them, the extension by the supposition operator
is worth mentioning (Routley, 1980, pp. 270-272). Routley introduces the
supposition operator (or the presentation operator), s, as follows:
given the predicate f , the operator s yields the predicate s(f) —
also written sf — read ‘presents itself as f ’ or ‘says of itself that
it fs’ or ‘has suppositious f -ness’ (Routley, 1980, p. 270)
Routley requires the following condition on s:
(7) a. If ∼ch(f) then ch(sf)
b. If ch(f) then sf ≈ f
where ‘ch’ is a primitive predicate for characterizing predicates (that is, ch(f)
means that f is a characterizing, and thus, nuclear property) and ≈ is Leib-
nitz identity.11
To see his extension of CP, let us now introduce his ξ operator. ξ is a
description-forming operator. ‘ξxA(x)’ roughly corresponds to the English
indefinite NP ‘an A’. Then, according to Routley, (i) ξxA(x) is an object
which presents itself as A. However, (ii) this presentation may not be reliable
and it may not be the case that A(ξxA(x)). (ii) is reflected in the restricted
11Leibnitz identity is identity whose behavior is fixed by its reflexivity and substitutivity:
(8)≈ 1. u ≈ u
≈ 2. u ≈ v ⊃ .A(u) ⊃ A(v) (Routley, 1980, p. 200)
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CP. However, how about (i)? Routley commits himself to the idea that it
must always be the case that ξxA(x) presents itself as having A. This idea
is reflected in the following CP, which is formulated by using the supposition
operator.
(9) JCP: sA(ξxA) for every A for which sA is well-defined. (Routley, 1980,
p. 270)
Four remarks on JCP. First of all, JCP can be regarded as a version
of unrestricted CP in the sense that it can apply to any characterization
consisting of nuclear properties and/or extranuclear properties. This is be-
cause the supposition operator s is applicable to all nuclear properties and
all extranuclear properties.
Secondly, from JCP and Routley’s definition of the supposition operator,
we can infer nuclear CP. Suppose that A is a characterization consisting only
of nuclear properties. Then, since sA is the same as A, therefore, A(ξxA(x))
holds.
Thirdly, according to Routley, JCP enables us to distinguish an existent
golden mountain from a golden mountain (cf. Routley, 1980, p. 270). The
former is an object which has the nuclear properties of being golden, being a
mountain and s(existent), but the latter is an object which has being golden,
being a mountain and does not have s(existent). We will be back to this
point soon and see it in more detail from a semantic viewpoint.
Fourthly and finally, Routley applies the supposition operator to his the-
ory of fictional objects. It is often the case that a fictional story (explicitly
or implicitly) describes a character as having not only certain nuclear prop-
erties but also certain extranuclear properties. For example, it is natural to
hold that Holmes is described not only as being a detective but also as being
existent in Doyle’s Holmes stories. According to Routley, “[t]he full object
d is the object that has all the features precisely that [a story] S ascribes
to d ... The full object has ... all characterising features ... [and] all non-
characterising features ... ascribed to it in S in s-form” (Routley, 1980, pp.
596-597). For example, Holmes has the nuclear properties of being a detective
and of presenting itself as existent (s(existent)), but lacks the extranuclear
property of being existent.
Given, in particular, the third and forth remarks, even though Routley
does not explicitly specify this, it is reasonable to suppose that JCP goes
along with the following semantics of ξ-terms.
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(10) ‘ξxA(x)’ denotes an arbitrary object which has sA, that is,
[[ξxA(x)]] = c([[sA]])
where c is a choice function from the power set of the domain, D, to
D such that c(D′) ∈ D′ for any non empty D′ (⊆ D).
Consider ‘ξx(x is an existent golden mountain)’.12 As Routley does, let
us suppose that the supposition operator s has the following distributive
property: s(A&B) ≈ (sA&sB) (cf. Routley, 1980, p. 270). Moreover, let us
recall that, if f is nuclear, then sf is the same as f . Then, according to (10),
‘ξx(x is an existent golden mountain)’ denotes an arbitrary object which
has the nuclear properties of being golden, being a mountain, and presenting
itself as existent. This object does not have the extranuclear property of
being existent, since, as a matter of (extra-logical) fact, there exist no golden
mountains.
The semantics of ξ-terms specified in (10), together with JCP, will solve
the problem concerning the distinction between an existent golden mountain
and a golden mountain. Originally, Routley’s semantics of ξ-terms is like
that of Hilbert’s ε-terms, except that the former lacks existential commit-
ment (Routley, 1980, pp. 197-199). ‘ξxA(x)’ denotes an arbitrary (existent
or nonexistent) object which satisfies A(x), if something satisfies A(x). A
problem arises when no object satisfies A. For example, even for Meinon-
gians, it is hard to reject that no object satisfies (in the actual world) the
condition x is golden & x is a mountain & x is existent, which consists of two
nuclear properties and an extranuclear properties. Then, what does ‘ξx(x is
golden & x is a mountain & x is existent)’, in short, ‘ξx(x is an existent
golden mountain)’ denote? An option is, reflecting Hilbert’s semantics, that
when no object satisfies A(x), then ‘ξxA(x)’ denotes an arbitrary object
taken from the whole domain. Then, ‘ξx(x is an existent golden mountain)’
denotes an arbitrary object which may not even be a mountain. At some
point, Routley gives us a less radical solution. According to him, when A
contains both nuclear properties and extranuclear properties, then ‘ξxA(x)’
denotes an arbitrary object which satisfies all of nuclear properties specified
by A. According to this semantics, ‘ξx(x is an existent golden mountain)’
12I assume that x is an existent golden mountain := (being existent & being golden &
being a mountain)(x).
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denotes an arbitrary nonexistent object which is a golden mountain. But,
if this is correct, there is no semantic difference between ‘ξx(x is an exis-
tent golden mountain)’ and ‘ξx(x is a golden mountain)’, which, intuitively
speaking, have different semantic behaviors. The semantics in (10), which
seems to be implicitly assumed by Routley, enables us to make the required
distinction. Indeed, in this semantics, ‘ξx(x is an existent golden mountain)’
denotes an arbitrary object which has the nuclear properties of being golden,
being a mountain, and presenting itself as existent, and ‘ξx(x is a golden
mountain)’ denotes an arbitrary object which has the nuclear properties of
being golden and being a mountain, but may not have the nuclear property
of presenting itself as existent.13
So far I have given an exposition of Routley’s JCP and the supposition
operator s, and examined how to modify semantics of ξ-term by incorpo-
rating s. In the next section, I propose a possible revision of JCP through
interpreting the supposition operator s as one which creates the intensional
predicate s(f) read as ‘being assumed to have f ’.
4 Beyond Routley’s nuclear Meiongianism
As we have seen in Section 2, Routley suggests that there is a strong con-
nection between presentation and assumption: x presents itself as having a
property f iff x is assumed to have f . This connection is further supported
by his comment that s(f) is read not only as presenting itself as f but also
as having suppositious f -ness (Routley, 1980, p. 270). Indeed, the latter
paraphrase strongly suggests that s(f) is the property of being supposed to
have f or one of being assumed to have f . Moreover, this reading explains
why JCP holds. As we have seen, Routley agrees with Priest that we can
freely assume any object to have any (nuclear or extranuclear) property. We
can take JCP which says that ξxA presents itself as satisfying A as just a
paraphrase of the Freedom of Assumption Principle.
13However, unfortunately, it is easy to point out a problem that is not yet solved by the
semantics in (10). For example, it fails to distinguish an existent golden mountain and
a golden mountain presenting itself as existent. This is because, according to (10), there
is no semantic difference between ξx(x is an existent golden mountain)’ and ‘ξx(x is a
golden mountain presenting itself as existent)’: Both of them denote an arbitrary object
which has the nuclear properties of being golden, being a mountain, and presenting itself
as existent.
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So, it is reasonable to interpret s(f), the property of presenting itself as
having f , as the property of being assumed to have f . However, it is also the
case that this understanding of s(f) has a certain conflict with, first, what
Routley explicitly says and, second, his own theory. Firstly, he says that
“[t]he “suppositious” terminology, adopted from Meinong, is thus somewhat
misleading, since sf is presumably extensional” (Routley, 1980, p. 270).
Secondly, as we have seen, (a) intensional properties like being thought about
by Russell are extranuclear; (b) the property of being assumed to have f is
naturally taken as an intensional property; and (c) s(f) is nuclear, for any f .
(a), (b) and (c) are incompatible, once we understand s(f) as the property
of being assumed to have f .
In this way, what Routley says about the nature of the supposition oper-
ator is ambivalent. On the one hand, s is an operator which, combined with
any property f , creates the intensional property of being assumed to have f .
On the other hand, s(f) is not an intensional property, since, it is a nuclear
property to which we can apply CP and no intensional property is nuclear.
Routley officially endorses the latter claim. However, as far as I can see, this
leaves it a mystery what exactly it means to say that an object presents itself
as having a property. Moreover, it is not clear why the supposition operator
has the features specified by Routley: How can the supposition operator turn
an extranuclear property into a nuclear property? Why does not adding it to
a nuclear property make any change to its nuclear status? All these things
are merely assumed and left unexplained. They are just ad hoc assumptions
made to incorporate an operator with the desired features into the frame-
work of nuclear Meinongianism.14 On the other hand, once we understand
s(f) as an intensional property, as we will see soon, we can give a certain
explanation to it based on world semantics.
So, pace Routley, let us stick with our interpretation of s(f) as the in-
tensional property of being assumed to have f . If so, we need to abandon
one among (a), (b) and (c). The most reasonable choice is to abandon (c).
Indeed, it is not clear why merely suppositious f -ness constitutes the nature
of an object. However, abandoning (c) results in some substantial changes
in Routley’s original theory. First of all, we cannot maintain the equation
of f and s(f) for nuclear f , since f is nuclear but s(f) isn’t. Neither does
s convert an extranuclear property into a nuclear property. Two defining
14See Berto (2013, p. 128) for a similar argument against the so-called watering-down
principle.
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features which Routley specifies for the supposition operator are no longer
maintained. More importantly, we can no longer regard JCP as a version of
nuclear CP, since JCP allows us to use s(f), which is extranuclear, to char-
acterize an object. So, at this point, our investigation goes beyond Routley’s
nuclear Meiongianism. However, it is still the case that our interpretation of
the supposition operator is on the same track as Routley’s in the sense that,
as we will see, under our interpretation, JCP holds.
In what follows, I give a sketch of a world semantics of the supposition op-
erator s based on the understanding of s(f) as the property of being assumed
to have f .
Let ϕ be any first-order one-place predicate. ϕ may be atomic, or may
be complex. The supposition operator s is an operator which creates an
intensional predicate s(ϕ) for any ϕ. s(ϕ) is read as ‘being assumed to have
ϕ’. A world semantics of s(ϕ) is given based on the idea that x’s being
assumed to have ϕ is analyzed as x’s having ϕ in all worlds where everything
assumed is realized.
A model < W,D,Rs, C, [[ ]] > is defined as follows. W is a set of worlds.
D is a set of individuals (as the constant domain). Rs is a relation between
worlds such that wRsw′ iff w′ is a world where everything assumed in w is
realized. I require that Rs satisfy the following condition:
(11) For any w there must be some w′ such that wRsw′
This requirement, together with (14), which is introduced below, ensures that
any assumption is realized at some world. C is a set of choice functions (see
(10)). [[ ]] is an interpretation function for nonlogical primitive constants.
[[ ]] is expanded for s(ϕ) and ξ-terms as follows. For s(ϕ):
(12) [[s(ϕ)]]w,g = {d ∈ D| for any w′, if wRsw′, then d ∈ [[ϕ]]w′,g }
where g is a variable assignment. Informally, an object d has the property
s(ϕ) in the world w iff d has ϕ in all worlds where what is assumed in w
holds.
The semantics of ξ-terms in (10) is elaborated as follows. Let us first
suppose that ξxϕ(x) is defined only if ϕ is a one place predicate and x is not
free in ϕ. Then, the interpretation of ‘ξxϕ(x)’ relative to a choice function c
is defined as follows.
(13) [[ξxϕ(x)]]w,g,c = c([[s(ϕ)]]w,g)
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Informally, ‘ξxϕ(x)’ denotes an arbitrary object which is assumed to have ϕ.
It is important to specify that the well-definedness of (13) depends on the
non-emptiness of [[s(ϕ)]]w,g, since c is defined only for nonempty subsets of
D. In order to ensure the non-emptiness of [[s(ϕ)]]w,g, I require that a model
satisfy the following condition:
(14) For any w and ϕ, some object d is such that for any w′, if wRsw′, then
d ∈ [[ϕ]]w′,g.
(14), together with (11), ensures that any assumption is realized at some
world. Note that this doesn’t mean that any assumption is realized at the
actual world (Rs needs not be reflexive, and thus @Rs@ needs not hold).
We can take this as reflecting Routley’s distinction between the Freedom of
Assumption Principle (any assumption about any object is realized at some
world) and the unrestricted CP (any assumption about any object holds in
the actual world). Of course, some assumption is true and realized at the
actual world. In this case, ‘ξxϕ(x)’ denotes an arbitrary object which is not
only assumed to have ϕ but also actually has ϕ.
The truth condition of atomic sentences containing ξ-term is defined as
follows (for simplicity, I treat only cases where a ξ-term is combined with
only a one-place predicate).
(15) [[ψ(ξxϕ(x))]]w,g = 1 iff for some c ∈ C, [[ξxϕ(x)]]w,g,c ∈ [[ψ]]w,g
Given these interpretations, it is quite easy to see that JCP holds.
(16) For any ϕ for which ξxϕ(x) is defined, for any w and for any g,
[[s(ϕ)(ξxϕ(x))]]w,g = 1
proof : By definition, [[s(ϕ)(ξxϕ(x))]]w,g = 1 iff
for some c ∈ C, [[ξxϕ(x)]]w,g,c ∈ [[s(ϕ)]]w,g iff
for some c ∈ C, c([[s(ϕ)]]w,g) ∈ [[s(ϕ)]]w,g
The last one holds, since, for any c and any non-empty D′ (⊆ D), c(D′) ∈ D′
and, by (11) and (14), [[s(ϕ)]]w,g is not empty. 2
So far this has been a sketch of a formal treatment of the supposition op-
erator interpreted as an intensional-predicate-forming operator. Many things
are left unspecified. Among them, the following is worthwhile mentioning. At
the beginning, it is said that ϕ may be complex. Nothing is said about which
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complex predicates the current theory has; nor is about how they semanti-
cally behave. Indeed, depending on how syntax and semantics of complex
predicates are elaborated, we obtain different theories. For example, sup-
pose that we have complex predicates of the form λx.¬A(x) and give them
semantics which ensures the biconditional λx.¬A(x)(y) iff ¬A(y). Further
suppose that we have complex predicates of the form λx.(A(x) ∧ B(x)) and
give them semantics which ensures the biconditional λx.(A(x) ∧ B(x))(y)
iff A(y) ∧ B(y). Then, the above framework, in particular due to (11) and
(14), requires impossible worlds where the contradiction A(x)∧¬A(x) holds.
Moreover, an extreme theory is obtained if we specify syntax and semantics
of complex predicates as follows: For any formula A containing at least one
free occurrence of x, λx.A is a one-place predicate; and for any A, λx.A(y)
iff A[x/y]. From this syntax and semantics of complex predicates, it follows
that some world in a model is trivial: From (11) and (14), for any B, in
some world w something is in [[λx.(x ∧ B)]]w,g. In such a world, given the
semantics for complex predicates, b ∧ B holds for some b, and thus, B does
too. It is worthwhile mentioning that the resulting theory is a version of
modal Meinongianism proposed and defended by Priest (2005, 2016). Modal
Meinongianism endorses the following modal CP, which is applicable to any
characterization without any restriction.
(17) modal CP: For any characterization, some object satisfies it in some
(possible or impossible) world(s) (and it may not be the actual world.)
Indeed, in our semantics, the combination of (11) and (14), together with
the syntax and semantics of complex predicates specified at the end of the
last paragraph, is regarded as a version of modal CP.15
15It is worth mentioning that the semantics presented here is only one way of interpreting
the supposition operator, which would be open to different interpretations. In particular,
given the fact that an assumption/supposition as a cognitive act is made by an agent,
it would be natural and reasonable to relativize the supposition operator to agents (and
maybe other contextual factors like time points). A way to incorporate this relativity to
a theory of the supposition operator is to introduce agent-indexed supposition operators
of the form sa, read as ‘being assumed to have by a’ (as an intentional operator Φ with a
term a in Priest (2005, 2016), aΦ combines with any formula to form a formula aΦA, read
as ‘a Φs that A’. ‘aΦA’ corresponds to a propositional attitude reports like ‘John believes
that Kyoto is beautiful’ and so on). A model contains, instead of Rs, a set of accessibility
relations on W , R, such that for each agent d, Rsd ∈ R, where wRsdw′ iff w′ is a world
where everything assumed by d in w is realized (cf. Priest, 2005, 2016, chap. 1).
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The interpretation of ‘ξxϕ(x)’ requires careful treatments. There are at least two dif-
ferent ways of defining it, which leads to two slightly different semantics, respectively.
The first option is (13’):
(13’) [[ξxϕ(x)]]w,g,c = c({d ∈ D| for some agent e, for any w′, if wRsew′, then d ∈ [[ϕ]]w
′,g}).
According to (13’), ‘ξxϕ(x)’ denotes an arbitrary object such that someone assumes it to
have ϕ. The interpretation of ‘sa(ϕ)’ is defined as follows:
(12’) [[sa(ϕ)]]w,g = {d ∈ D| for any w′, if wRs[[a]]w,gw′, then d ∈ [[ϕ]]w
′,g},
and, the requirement (14) is modified as follows:
(14’) For any w and ϕ, some object d and some agent e are such that for any w′, if
wRsew
′, then d ∈ [[ϕ]]w′,g.
From these definitions and requirement the following version of JCP is derived.
(16’) For any ϕ for which ξxϕ(x) is defined, for any w, there is an agent e such that for
any g which assigns e to x, [[sx(ϕ)(ξxϕ(x))]]w,g = 1
The second option is to define a context-sensitive semantics of ξ-terms. Suppose that
〈w, e〉, a pair of a world and an agent, is a context whose agent of assumption is e. Then,
the interpretation of ‘ξxϕ(x)’ relative to a choice function c in a context 〈w, e〉 is defined
as follows:
(13”) [[ξxϕ(x)]]〈w,e〉,g,c = c({d ∈ D| for any w′, if wRsew′, then d ∈ [[ϕ]]〈w
′,e〉,g})
According to (13”), ‘ξxϕ(x)’ denotes an arbitrary object such that the agent of the context
in question assumes it to have ϕ. Let us suppose that only ξ-terms are context-sensitive
in the relevant sense: So, any atomic expression ε, [[ε]]〈w,e〉,g = [[ε]]w,g. The interpretation
of ‘sa(ϕ)’ is defined as follows:
(12”) [[sa(ϕ)]]〈w,e〉,g = {d ∈ D| for any w′, if wRs[[a]]w,gw′, then d ∈ [[ϕ]]〈w
′,e〉,g}
and the truth condition of atomic sentences containing a ξ-term in a context is:
(15”) [[ψ(ξxϕ(x))]]〈w,e〉,g = 1 iff for some c ∈ C, [[ξxϕ(x)]]〈w,e〉,g,c ∈ [[ψ]]〈w,e〉,g
(14) is modified as follows:
(14”) For any w and ϕ, some object d and some agent e are such that for any w′, if
wRsew
′, then d ∈ [[ϕ]]〈w′,e〉,g.
In this semantics, the following version of JCP holds.
(16”) For any ϕ for which ξxϕ(x) is defined, for any w, there is an agent e such that for
any g which assigns e to x, [[sx(ϕ)(ξxϕ(x))]]〈w,e〉,g = 1
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5 Conclusion
We have arrived at the following picture of Routley’s Meinongianism: On
the one hand, based on the distinction between an unrestricted CP and the
Freedom of Assumption Principle, Routley endorses a restricted CP. Even
though his double determination argument fails to give a good reason to re-
strict the applicability of CP to nuclear properties, it is still the case that the
distinction is quite reasonable: We can freely assume any object to have any
property, but this doesn’t mean that the assumed object really has the as-
sumed property. Assumptions are unrestricted, but may not be realized. On
the other hand, he proposes a different version of CP, JCP, which does justice
to the Freedom of Assumption Principle. According to JCP, for any A, ξxA
presents itself as having A. Routley formulates JCP by using the supposition
operator, s, which creates a property of presenting itself as having f . Assum-
ing sf is nuclear no matter whether f is nuclear or extranuclear, he claims
that JCP is still formulated within the framework of nuclear Meinongianism.
However, this assumption is ad hoc and it is natural to interpret the suppo-
sition operator s as an intensional-predicate-forming operator. Based on this
interpretation, I diverged from Routley’s original nuclear Meinongianism and
gave a formal treatment of the supposition operator within the framework
of world semantics, which assimilates his view with modal Meinongianism.
In this reconstruction of Routley’s Meinongianism, his endorsement of a re-
stricted CP, on the one hand, and the Freedom of Assumption Principle, on
the other hand, is recaptured in the following way: some assumptions of an
object fail to be the case in the actual world; however, any assumption of
any object is realized in some (possible or impossible) world(s).
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that, later, Routley/Sylvan explicitly
endorsed such twofold, pluralist metaphysics.16 By using a metaphor of the
city center and suburbs, Sylvan (1995) proposes that only the restricted CP
holds in the city center (that is, the actual world17), but any characterization
is realized in suburbs (that is, some impossible worlds) and, thus, CP is
unrestricted there. As this paper has shown, we can find a sign of this
pluralist picture even in his early version of Meinongianism.
16I thank Filippo Casati for indicating me the similarity between my reconstruction of
Routley (1980) and the late Routley/Sylvan’s thought.
17More precisely, the actual worlds, since, surprisingly, Sylvan endorses the plurality of
the actual worlds. See Sylvan (1997).
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